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honorable as the man's self-surrender to the good of his lord and country." How voluntary this self-surrender was may be judged from the statement that "from earliest youth she was taught to deny herself." He fears that if woman should be granted rights of her own, it would be at "a loss of that sweetness of disposition, that gentleness of manner which are her present heritage," and criticises "the individualism of the Anglo-Saxon" which "cannot let go of the idea that husband and wife are two persons" and have "separate rights" that should be recognized. Though the feudal system was broken up, the spirit of the Precepts of Knighthood continued to be felt, according to the author, not less in the universal politeness of the people than in the physical endurance, fortitude and bravery of the soldiers and the universal loyalty to the throne and patriotism. To the same source he also traces the great transformation whose strongest motive was "the sense of honor which cannot bear being looked upon as an inferior power." Some defects, such as the distaste for philosophical speculation, "the exaggerated sensitiveness and touchiness," and possibly a tendency to conceit, are also referred to the same cause. The author believes that "Christian missions have done and will do great things for Japan—in the domain of education, and especially of moral education," but thinks that "Christianity, in its American and English form—with more of Anglo-Saxon freaks and fancies than grace and purity of the founder—is a poor scion to graft on Bushido stock." A new ethics he deems unavoidable. Like its symbolic flower, the cherry blossom, Bushido may die "at the first gust of the morning breeze," but after it is blown to the four winds, it will still bless mankind with its perfume. The volume is dedicated to an uncle who taught the author "to revere the past and to admire the deeds of the Samurai." The characteristic Japanese design that graces the cover was made by Miss Anna C. Hartshorne.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE. By L. Lévy-Bruhl. Authorized translation, to which is prefixed an Introduction by Frederic Harrison, M. A. London: Swan Sonnenschein. 1903, pp. xiv, 363.

A translation of M. Lévy-Bruhl's masterly exposition of the philosophy of Comte ought to be heartily welcomed by English

readers. According to Mr. Harrison "no one abroad or at home, certainly neither Mill, nor Lewes, nor Spencer, nor Caird, has so truly grasped and assimilated Comte's ideas as M. Lévy-Bruhl has done." And, apart from any such comparisons, there can certainly be no difference of opinion as to the extraordinary merits of the work. It unites in a remarkable degree breadth of treatment with definiteness and lucidity. And as the author not only possesses this gift for exposition, but has the fullest sympathy with his subject, he is able to present a view of Comte's philosophy as a whole which will be something like a revelation to any who are accustomed to take Comte's name as standing either for a superficial generalisation as to the three stages of thought or for the preposterous invention of a new religion.

With the religious side of Comte's system M. Lévy-Bruhl does not concern himself. Not that he accepts the criticism which would sever the religion from the philosophy. On the contrary, he upholds the unity of Comte's doctrine as a whole. But he exercises his right as a historian to distinguish in the light of the subsequent movement of thought between what is of more, and what is of less, enduring philosophical interest.

"The object of the present work," he explains, "is to study Comte's philosophy properly so called, leaving aside the transformation of this philosophy into religion. The choice which we thus make is not an arbitrary one, since, in order to justify it, we have the distinction formally established by Comte himself, when he admits that his philosophy and his religion might have been the work of two different persons.

"It will perhaps be asked in what our position differs from that of Littré, and of the 'incomplete positivists.' By the difference, we shall answer, which separates the historical from the dogmatic point of view. It is from the latter point of view that Littré and his friends reject the 'systematisation of the feelings,' the subjective method, and the religion of Humanity. It is as positivists that they connect themselves with the first half of the doctrine, and that they exclude the second half. But we are here working from the historical point of view, and the historian, while using his right to define the limits of his work, has nothing to exclude from the doctrine which he sets forth. As a matter of fact, far from claiming with Littré that the second part of Comte's work weakens and contradicts the first, we have recog-

nised that they both form a whole of which he had drawn out the plan in his early writings. . . .

"But then, why only study the first of the two careers, why not respect the integrity of that whole which, according to us, Littré ought not to have disregarded? We do respect it, for we do not arbitrarily exclude from the doctrine any of the parts which Comte included in it. If we make the philosophy proper the sole object of this study, in it we shall ever have before our minds the idea of the greater whole in which Comte placed it. On this condition alone, our study will be accurate. But once this condition is fulfilled we do not consider that we exceed our right in concentrating our effort upon the philosophy" (pp. 14, 15).

As an exposition M. Lévy-Bruhl's work must be allowed to be masterly. And since he confines himself almost wholly to sympathetic exposition there is little more to be said. Those who come to the study of the Positive Philosophy from other points of view are hardly likely to accept all the claims which M. Lévy-Bruhl, speaking as its expositor, makes on its behalf. And when they compare the very exalted philosophical rank which he is apparently prepared to assign to Comte as the founder of sociology, and therefore of Positive Philosophy, with the admissions later on that Comte "believed this new science to be far more advanced by his own labors than it was in reality" and that "Sociologists at present believe that almost everything remains to be done," they will probably feel that his estimate of Comte's historic importance is exaggerated or, to say the least, premature. He compares Comte's relation to sociology with that of Descartes to physical science. Just as Descartes conceived a mathematical ideal of physical science, so Comte, he would say, conceived a positive ideal of social science. But perhaps it will be time enough to make the comparison when sociology has got beyond the stage of being merely an ideal. It will then be easier to know exactly what is meant by a "theoretical science of the individual and social nature of man, constituted by means of a purely positive method" to which "pædagogy, rational economy, politics, and in general all the social arts in the future will be subordinated"; and easier also to estimate the philosophical value of the conception of such a science.

The translation is very readable, and, so far as may be con-

jectured without comparison with the original, appears to be almost always well and carefully done. There are slips here and there which it does not need comparison to detect, but the only thing one cares to mention is the use, irritating because it recurs so incessantly, of "to" instead of "for" after the verb "substitute," *e. g.*, "substitute the relative *to* the absolute point of view. Mr. Harrison's Introduction [or Note, as it is afterwards more appropriately called] is, he explains, a notice of the book, written on the appearance of the French original and now reprinted nearly as written.

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THE CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM AND OTHER MATTERS CONTRIBUTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE HERBARTIAN QUESTION. By F. H. Hayward, D. Lit., M. A., B. Sc. (Lond.), B. A. (Cantab), assisted by M. E. Thomas, Battersea Polytechnic. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1903.

HERBART AND THE HERBARTIAN THEORY OF EDUCATION, A CRITICISM. By Alexander Darroch, M. A. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903.

There is a certain amount of similarity in the contents of these two volumes, but they differ essentially in purpose and in method of treatment. Dr. Hayward writes as a professed and enthusiastic Herbartian, and in reproducing the criticisms of others he does so with the object of showing that "as the system is grounded upon many a deep moral and psychological truth, though its outworks may fall to ruin, its main walls will surely stand" (p. 17). Professor Darroch, on the contrary, is a firm opponent of the doctrines he regards as fundamental to Herbartianism, and he writes with a conviction which derives its strength from a definite philosophical position of his own—a position which it is the positive aim of his book to enforce and recommend. Equally marked with this difference in aim is a difference in method of treatment. Professor Darroch gives us a continuous and sustained argument, Dr. Hayward a series of disconnected, and not entirely consistent, summaries. Fourteen sets of criticisms are summarized, and the one principle of arrangement is that of authors' names. It seems to us that a systematic treatment under topics would have been more helpful to the reader.